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Ethnic conflict has been a major problem that has plagued contemporary Central 
Africa, spreading across the continent. Often various tribes and ethnic groups have long 
standing histories of conflict amongst themselves that may perhaps explain these 
outbreaks of violence; however, far too often ethnic conflict has spawned from politics 
and socio-economic biases, rather than simply cultural issues.  
The colonization and seemingly nonsensical division of Africa by European 
powers in the late nineteenth century did nothing to prevent or stave ethnic conflict in the 
coming decades—indeed the politically motivated creation of new borders on the 
continent at least moderately contributed to later ethnic conflict. But did the festering 
wounds left by the European colonizers directly cause later ethnic violence? Rather than 
asking such a specific question, it is better to examine these conflicts as having both 
ultimate and more immediate causes. And this is how we must examine the case of 
Rwanda, and even its closely related sister, Burundi: indeed, their Belgian colonizers 
bred problems that ultimately led to the countries’ ethnic problems, culminating in a 
number of genocides in the latter half of the twentieth century; but it was their own 
people and political make-up that was directly at the root of the problem. Moreover the 
ultimate and more immediate causes often comingle, as one may give rise to the other. 
Because of the shifts in political power brought on by the Belgians in their countries the 
various ethnic groups there became increasingly more violent. Soon violent incidents 
became the norm, directly ushering in the ethnic conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi 
years later. 
As with any major event, there are a multitude of complex issues that may act as 
probable causes. For our purposes we will focus mainly on how the political and 
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economic atmosphere in Rwanda gave rise to the violence of the genocide. Indeed, 
numerous other factors contributed to the tragedy, but none of them had as strange an 
influential impact as the dire political climate at the time. And in that are included 
underlying issues such as the social structure in the country at the time, as well as major 
economic problems that plagued Rwanda. Nevertheless we must, at the very least, treat 
with some examination other factors, such as colonialism and demographics in Rwandan 
history. However, the political make-up of Rwanda immediately prior to 1994 (namely 
that of the Habyarimana administration), as I will argue, was the greatest of these issues 
that contributed to the ethnic conflict and subsequent genocide.  
Burundi is a case very similar to that of Rwanda: the two neighboring countries 
housed the same Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. Both grew from the same colonial 
background. However, independence left different groups in power. In Burundi, unlike 
Rwanda, the Tutsi remained the powerful ruling elites. Nevertheless, the political 
underpinnings in Burundi proved to be a major factor that culminated in the 1972 
genocide of the Hutu people. Again, politics prevailed over ethnic and social reasons to 
explain the bloodshed. 
But Burundi is a unique case in that even after the 1972 genocide bloodshed 
would continue—in 1993, after the Hutu gained political power in the country, many 
Tutsi were killed. Obviously, again, politics proved potent as the administration of 
President Ndadaye inevitably escalated the violence associated with the 1993 genocide. 
And while the circumstances in Burundi are fundamentally the same as those in the case 
of Rwanda, the fact that different ethnic groups supported genocide in the two separate 
countries proves that ethnicity was not the problem—politics and democratization was.  
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So what were the real causes of these ethnic tensions? Did the shared colonial 
histories of Rwanda and Burundi set the stage for their respective genocide events, or did 
those episodes arise from separate internal causes? In the region by this time genocide 
had seemingly become the norm—in many ways an end to the violence was 
unfathomable. The first Burundian genocide of 1972 offered a rallying cry for many Hutu 
that would later fuel their fire to massacre the Tutsi. And that indeed happened: first in 
1993 in Burundi, and then in 1994 in Rwanda. A clear connection can be made between 
these latter two cases, and that connection centers on the political administrations in the 
two countries at the time. The domestic politics, as well as foreign affairs, conducted by 
both spelled clear doom for one ethnic group. Bloodshed ensued and was hardly staved 
without foreign intervention. With the overthrow of these governments the genocides 
were concluded, but the wounds remained—the memories were not forgotten, not in 
Rwanda, not in Burundi, and not in Central Africa.  
Indeed, the genocides in both Burundi and Rwanda were caused by governmental 
policy, more so than by ethnic issues and biases. Internal factors in each country greatly 
affected the escalation of tensions to a violent level. However, external factors, such as 
foreign state and international institution involvement, played minor factors in causing 
the genocide. Colonialism and the wounds it left were never the problem—instead the 
new policies of violence and racial superiority preached by the Rwandan and Burundian 
governments were the true culprits. Understanding these factors, internal and external, 
political and ideological, best explains the historical progression of genocide in Central 
Africa.  
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To understand the true causes of these genocides helps us to learn from our 
mistakes. As we work alongside other states, as we attempt to harbor better relationships 
internationally, we all must work to stave violence and ethnic biases. Ethnic tension has 
long proven to be an incredibly dangerous phenomenon, most often ending in the deaths 
of thousands of innocent lives around the world—we need not look beyond Rwanda or 
Burundi to understand that. And that alone is reason enough to study the circumstances 
surrounding genocide. Armed with the knowledge of what causes genocide, we are armed 
with the knowledge of how to stop it.  
Discussions on humanitarianism, humanitarian intervention, and ethnic conflict 
attempt to imbue humanity with a better understanding of how we can better our world, 
and how we can eliminate needless violence. And in these discussions, opinions differ 
about the best ways to tackle various situations. In a field of such varied views, numerous 
divisions can be made. In the field, macro divisions can be drawn, between those who 
support some sort of intervention, and those who believe that conflicts should be left to 
play out. Intervention and ethnic conflict are themselves hotly contested issues, as debate 
rages about the participation each merits from the international community, or rather 
anyone other than the nation state at the center. Regardless of these divisions, however, 
we must ask how these opinions are developed when thinking about the genocide in 
Rwanda. 
 When we consider the issues at hand in Rwanda, the macro divisions become 
more focused, as some argue over the construction of the genocide as “ethnic conflict,” 
rather than some recent government construction. While others still focus their critiques 
on the international community’s involvement in the genocide. 
 6 
 Yahya Sadowski, in her article entitled “Ethnic Conflict,” broadly discusses the 
place of ethnic conflict in the evolving post-Cold War international system. Sadowski 
posits that while ethnic conflict itself is a long-standing historical issue, it is ultimately an 
issue that continues to evolve and develop in modern times. Often “modern hate” 
inflames ethnic issues ultimately into conflict, but any modern conflict never reaches a 
fever pitch, so to speak, due to old wounds. As applied to Rwanda, these claims challenge 
the established ideas that the genocide ultimately developed from some of the ethnic 
tensions stemming from the Belgian occupation of the region. Sadowski shrugs such a 
point off—arguing instead that modern hatred, especially developed by the government, 
escalated tensions.  
 Zeric Smith, in his “The Impact of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on 
Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions,” argues that 
other factors—such as liberalization and democratization—are more prevalent in 
explaining the changing trends of ethnic conflict. In a quantitative analysis of a number 
of theories concerning the relationship between conflict and civil liberties and 
democracy, Smith discovered that conflict and ultimately genocide are inextricably 
linked with other so-called political factors. Smith’s analysis informs us that 
democratization has little to no effect on ethnic conflict. Whereas a far-reaching 
democratic government might seem to produce decreased conflict, this simply was not 
quantitatively demonstrable. Instead, increased liberalization—that is, the increased 
allowance and support of civil liberties—clearly decreased ethnic conflicts for some time.  
 Given the governmental breakdown that occurred weeks before the genocide in 
Rwanda, Smith’s findings become particularly applicable. The quantitative assessment of 
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liberalization as a primary factor to changing the trends of ethnic conflict can be greatly 
applied to a more qualitative study of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi. And this 
lends credence and value to any study on the subject that is based wholly on mere 
subjective opinion. In that respect, Smith’s study is an invaluable asset for our purposes. 
Indeed, this study should be viewed alongside other works on ethnic conflict as a 
supportive posit of theory. It is not, in and of itself, some sort of seminal work. 
 Others, like Helen Hintjens, more specifically comment on the rising and falling 
actions of the genocide itself. In her article, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” 
Hintjens posits a number of factors that explain the occurrence of the genocide. Departing 
from some of the more common arguments, she claims that the Habyarimana 
administration played an unequaled role in escalating tensions and encouraging conflict. 
Hintjens, furthermore, argues that the international community along with major 
international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, helped to influence conflict. 
Many do not speak sufficiently to the effect that the international community helped raise 
tensions; rather, authors more often speak about international involvement in intervention 
efforts. Overall, Hintjens develops somewhat new arguments that explain some of the 
multifaceted reasons behind the genocide by ultimately separating herself from the more 
common claims of other authors. And indeed, Hintjens is not alone, as Catharine 
Newbury, in her article “Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda,” echoes many 
of the same findings, but focuses more primarily on the domestic political and historical 
issues. And others still, like Peter Langford in his “The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The 
Genesis of the Capacity of the Rwandan Post-Colonial State to Organize and Unleash a 
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Project of Extermination,” describe exclusively the inextricable link between government 
policies and genocide actions.  
 These articles offer a plethora of information that greatly focuses much of the 
research in their field. Often authors focus their discussions of Rwanda on how the 
genocide of 1994 illustrated the need for humanitarian intervention, or claims to the 
contrary. In regards to the inner working of Rwanda at the time, authors commonly also 
limited themselves to a discussion of the long-standing issues among the various ethnic 
groups as a way to demonstrate growing tension and conflict. Nevertheless, in so vast a 
field of often-repetitive information, new arguments must develop to possibly better 
explain the causes and effects of the genocide in Rwanda. Smith’s and Sadowski’s 
research, while it does not comment on Rwanda or Burundi in particular, does argue for 
much of the reasoning that Hintjens, Newbury, Verwimp, Langford, and others employ. 
It is their opposition to a simple understanding of ethnic conflict as arising solely from 
ethnic tensions that is the foundation of my own research in this paper.  
Hintjens, Newbury, and Langford, furthermore, also provide solid foundation to 
my own research on the issues of genocide in Central Africa. Hintjens’ research focuses 
primarily on the Rwandan genocide’s profound relationship with domestic political 
policy and foreign economic and governmental involvement. This argues that there were 
indeed both external and internal factors that caused the 1994 genocide—factors that 
were more influential than simply ethnic biases. Newbury and Langford agree: the 
Rwandan domestic government policies of hatred and racial superiority more so caused 
the genocide than perhaps colonial memories. While their research focuses only on the 
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link between Rwandan history and its domestic policies, their conclusions match that of 
Hintjens, leaving little question that ethnicity was not the true problem.  
Each author is equally valuable in his or her contribution to the field of research 
in discovering the real causes behind genocide in Central Africa. Each offers different, 
yet equally valid, reasoning for the causes of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Sadowski 
and Smith discuss the more macrocosmic reasoning behind ethnic conflict as a whole, 
and how it may be applied to any given situation, while the others apply those principles 
on a smaller, more focused scale. However, none provide information on the link 
between the Burundian genocides and the later Rwandan genocide. Barren of any 
mention of so important an event, these authors do not fully cover the gamut of 
reasoning’s explaining the long history of ethnic conflicts and genocides in Central 
Africa in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
 Indeed, little research can be unearthed that comments at all on the Burundian 
genocides of either 1972 or 1993. Burundi and Rwanda shared a long cultural, ethnic, 
colonial, and political history, leaving the two nations strongly linked. To leave research 
on the genocide of Rwanda barren of comment on Burundi, or vice versa, is truly unfair. 
The genocides of Central Africa cannot be fully explained without an understanding of 
both sides of the issue, with comment on both countries, and the relationship between the 
two. My research aims to do just that—to explain the relationship between the genocides 
of Burundi and the genocide in Rwanda. This relationship can best be explained through 
discussion of the two countries’ shared histories, political dynamics, and developing 
ethnic make-ups, and how the two differ or perhaps affect one another. Indeed a link 
exists between the two, and the reasons behind the ethnic tensions and conflicts in 
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Central Africa cannot be fully understood without first gaining an understanding of all 
the constituent issues. 
 In order to better understand how escalating political tensions inevitably caused 
the Rwandan and Burundian genocides, we must first examine ethnic conflict as a term. 
Ethnic conflict is, in many ways, any sort of major conflict between two or more ethnic 
groups or between ethnic groups and the state, based primarily upon ethnically charged 
issues, disagreements, or issues. Indeed, these conflicts may arise as a result of ethnic 
nationalism, as is often the case; however, there need not be any single specific reasoning 
at its root. Furthermore, these conflicts, due to their intense nature, often can escalate, as 
with the case of Rwanda and Burundi, into genocide, which Hintjens1 defines as “a form 
of one-sided mass killing in which the state or other authority intends to destroy a group, 
as that group and membership in it are identified by the perpetrator.” If we maintain this 
definition, we can more fully examine and understand how decades of Rwandan ethnic 
conflict ultimately culminated in the 1994 genocide. But it is necessary to note an 
important distinction—that ethnic conflict and other occurrences of intrastate organized 
violence, such as civil wars, are not one in the same. Civil war need not be confined to 
ethnic groups; rather only organized groups, such as political organizations or more 
commonly armies themselves, must combat one another. Furthermore, civil wars are, 
very often, confined to the borders of one nation or state, whereas the same is not 
necessarily true of ethnic conflicts. Perhaps the distinctions are small, but they are 
nonetheless important, because in Rwanda and Burundi ethnic conflict is most classically 
considered to have occurred—not necessarily civil war. 
                                            
1
 Hintjens, H. M. (1999, June). Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 246. 
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Ethnic conflict, contrary to popular belief, is not always the product of historically 
long-standing disputes. In fact, as Sadowski2 claims, “the reality is that most ethnic 
conflicts are expressions of ‘modern hate’ and largely products of the twentieth century.” 
And this is especially true for Africa, as many major African ethnic conflicts are able to 
trace their origins to the immediate past. Furthermore, ethnic conflicts are not always 
caused by cultural differences. Although cultural or caste divisions may tend to spur on 
or intensify ethnic violence, nevertheless it is often only one of many contributing 
factors. Smith3 proffers that ethnic conflict may find its roots in a number of things, such 
as “over access to material goods as well as over intangible goods such as power, respect, 
or social status.”  
 Prior to the twentieth century, ethnic conflict had never been a real problem in 
Africa proper, much less so in Central and Eastern Africa more specifically. Prior to the 
Berlin Conference of 1884, ethnic groups in the region had lived peacefully, commonly 
intermarrying and building other societal bonds. But during the 1880s many of the 
European powers decided, in the interest of expanded their own power, to begin 
colonizing the African continent to exploit it for territorial and economic gain. Politically 
motivated debate and disagreement soon followed, leaving randomly assigned borders on 
the map, commonly dividing historically close ethnic groups, and often enclosing 
together hostile groups. With these sudden changes what had been long-standing peaceful 
unions would soon, in many tragic cases, become ultimately violent conflicts. Fortunately 
                                            
2
 Sadowski, Y. (1998). Ethnic Conflict, Foreign Policy, No. 111, 13. 
3
 Smith, Z. K. (2000, March). The Impact of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation 
on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An Empirical Test of Common Assumptions, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, Vo1. 38, No. 1, 24. 
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enough, however, this was not the case in either Rwanda or Burundi; nevertheless with 
the help of inner political pressure the divides between the Tutsi and Hutu would be 
highlighted and exploited, directly causing violent action. 
Historically Rwanda was a unified country, sharing the same culture and political 
system (a central monarchy), but there were three major castes that divided the nation 
into the Hutu, Tutsi, and the Twa. Nonetheless these castes lived peacefully, commonly 
intermarrying; and social mobility between the castes was not uncommon. However, 
when the Germans colonized the nation after the Berlin Conference, things changed. By 
the end of World War I, the League of Nations mandated that Belgium govern the area of 
Ruanda-Urundi. Soon the Belgians changed the political system—they abolished the 
central monarchy and set up the minority Tutsi as the ruling local elite. Soon areas that 
had a long-standing history of Hutu leadership were put under the control of the Tutsi. As 
evidence, until 1929 about one third of the tribal leaders in Rwanda had been Hutu, but 
the Belgians quickly eliminated all non-Tutsi chiefs. By 1933 the colonial power issued 
mandatory identity cards, which fixed each person’s identity as either Hutu or Tutsi, 
leaving generations with an inseparable label. As Belgian backing increased, so did the 
Tutsi’s ability to more widely exploit the Hutu politically.  
 After World War II the United Nations and other global powers began pressuring 
Belgium to grant Ruanda-Urundi independence. But before they did so, the Belgians held 
open elections, in which the Hutu gained a majority of seats in the legislature. Now all 
the power lay in the hands of the formerly exploited majority. Extremist groups on both 
ends of the spectrum gradually tried to take over, leading to massive political instability. 
These seething problems overflowed when Tutsi extremists attacked Hutu leaders, 
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eventually leading to a Hutu massacre of 10,000 Tutsi and the expulsion of more than 
130,000 others from the country. By the time that Belgium granted Rwanda full 
independence, its one-party Hutu government continued previous violence against the 
Tutsi refugees. The violence, however, would not end for some time; and when Tutsi 
rebel forces assassinated then-president Juvenal Habyarimana, many more Tutsi were to 
be killed in 1994. 
 But what caused this ethnic violence? Was it the cultural and historical 
differences between these two castes that eventually led to such a major genocide? No, 
not entirely; instead it was political instability and social cleavages that led to ethnic 
violence in Rwanda. For centuries the Hutu and Tutsi had lived in harmony. They both 
lived under a central monarchy, the Banyarwanda. That only changed when the Belgians 
took over the country.  
Problems didn’t manifest until the Belgians decided to change the political 
structure of the country, putting the Tutsi in power, subject only to the colonial 
government. This action ultimately undermined the politics of the country, which had 
been under the control of Hutu chiefs for years. However, before granting the country 
independence, Belgium gave all political power back to the Hutu. Furthermore, while 
occupying the region, the Belgians had inevitably caused changes to the philosophy of 
the social structure among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.  
The Hutu and Twa were ethnically Bantu (a group from the Great Lakes region); 
however, the Tutsi were Hatitic, meaning that they were not native, like the other two 
groups. Prior to European intervention none of this mattered—the Tutsi, Twa, and Hutu 
all coexisted harmoniously in their society. But when the Hutu finally gained political 
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power in the newly independent Rwanda, they began to “purge” the society of these 
foreigners. In fact, only two years before the 1994 genocide, the major Hutu politician 
Leon Mugesera heralded the genocide when he said that all Tutsi should be sent “back 
home to Ethiopia,” from where they had supposedly come. It was obvious that by the 
time the Belgian colonialists left the region, they had instilled in the Hutu, at the very 
least, a strong zeal for their own ethnic superiority over the Tutsi. Nevertheless this zeal 
was nothing compared to what the Habyarimana and earlier Kayibanda administrations 
had done to instill great hatred between the two ethnic groups by 1994. 
The post-independence democracy was, if anything, more of an authoritarian style 
government. The first president of Rwanda, Gregoire Kayibanda, was anything but 
sympathetic to the Tutsi, as his government continued to kill and expel them from the 
country. Many Tutsi fled to neighboring Burundi, where they would comprise a new 
government. But in light of this, Kayibanda’s regime dissolved political and economic 
ties with Burundi and began to kill some 14,000 more Tutsi. Kayibanda’s government 
would continue to stifle any and all Tutsi efforts for political and civil liberalization. 
During a 1972 coup, Kayibanda was overthrown and killed, and Juvenal 
Habyarimana became president. But his administration was worse than that of his 
predecessor. Habyarimana refused to allow even basic human rights to the Tutsi, as he 
continued to expel many more from the country. All vestiges of democracy in Rwanda 
were disappearing as the PARMEHUTU party (the only political party allowed in 
Rwanda) still controlled the legislature. In the coming years of his twenty-two year reign, 
Habyarimana set himself up as an authoritarian leader in Rwanda, giving all to the Hutu, 
while taking everything from the Tutsi. 
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The question of whether Kayibanda’s and Habyarimana’s actions played a more 
significant role in inciting the Rwandan genocide still remains. The political implications 
of their administrations’ actions were certainly a contributing factor to the genocide. 
Their choke-hold on the democratic institutions in Rwanda as well as their policies of 
non-liberalization for Tutsi were probably the greatest contributing factor politically for 
the genocide. 
Many scholars have posited that democratization should bring about decreases in 
ethnic conflict, whereas political liberalization will result in increases in ethnic conflict in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Smith, however, found that this was not the case. In fact, the 
opposite was true—democratization has little effect on ethnic conflict, while political 
liberalization (greater access to civil liberties) decreases ethnic conflict. However, these 
findings do not preclude the possibility that a denial of civil liberties and basic rights 
would heighten ethnic violence. This seems to be the precise case in Rwanda during the 
Habyarimana administration—the Hutu government openly refused the Tutsi civil 
liberties and expelled them from the country (if they did not kill them), and as a result of 
this treatment, tensions would eventually reach a breaking point. However, numerous 
other political and economic factors played a role in ushering in the genocide. 
Upon Juvenal Habyarimana’s entrance into the presidency, Rwanda was a rather 
wealthy country, at least by African standards at the time. By the 1980s, Habyarimana 
had ushered in a time of great prosperity for all Rwandans. Many considered Rwanda the 
African model for orderliness and service: it had a great infrastructural base, there was 
incredible access to health care, primary education was readily available, and clean 
drinking water was abundant, all things few African countries at the time could claim. 
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However, this economic prosperity didn’t last. In 1986-1987, receipts from coffee sales 
fell from 14 billion to 5 billion Rwandan francs in less than a year’s time. Because the 
coffee trade was so important to the Rwandan economy, external debt accumulated. As a 
result redistributional and welfare policies came under mounting pressure that ultimately 
affected many Hutu. But over time it became increasingly obvious that these problems 
were not being blamed on external, uncontrollable factors; instead, the regime’s political 
rhetoric suggested that the Tutsi, who worked as traders and merchants, were being 
blamed for Rwanda’s economic collapse. As Hintjens4 states, “An uneasy coexistence 
had emerged between the political and administrative Bahutu elite and the economic 
Batutsi elite.” 
In the face of an invasion by the Tutsi-backed Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in 
the early 1990s, the Habyarimana administration yielded to pressure from the World 
Bank and IMF to implement structural adjustment programs. Of course, that meant that 
Rwanda’s national currency would immediately fall in value (by about two-thirds). With 
a range of other problems in Rwanda, the country could not maintain its numerous 
services, and eventually the infant and maternal mortality rates rose. Nevertheless the 
government did find the funds to bolster the Rwandan military forces. As a matter of fact, 
Habyarimana and his political allies diverted funds from domestic services in favor of 
military spending. Not only that, but citizens were encouraged by the government to form 
“death squads” to fight the RPF and their Tutsi allies. Through a regimen of lies and 
propaganda Habyarimana was turning the whole country against the Tutsi.  
                                            
4
 Hintjens, 257. 
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As the country slipped further and further into economic crisis, the government 
refused to make the right decisions. Whereas the Hutu political party (the only legally 
permitted party) could have shared power with opposition parties, so that the World Bank 
would release their funds to the desperate county, they refused flatly. As they denied to 
do the right thing for their people, extremist Hutu politicians and military leaders, instead, 
turned to genocide as the only solution—the Tutsi, as they claimed, had caused the 
problem, and killing them was the “final solution.”  
While Rwanda’s socio-economic problems snowballed, the government was 
supposed to democratize the country. The terms from the IMF and World Bank were 
simple: end political stalemate to access the structural adjustment program’s 30 million 
dollar funds. But “the imposition of such rigid political conditionality on Rwanda’s 
government hastened moves towards a violent ‘final solution’ to the country’s 
socioeconomic and political problems.”5 
Political liberalization, or even democratization, could have done wonders to help 
prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Allowing more civil liberties and political power to the 
Tutsi during the Habyarimana administration could have significantly altered the 
outcome for so many innocent Rwandan victims. But sadly, none of that occurred. 
Instead Juvenal Habyarimana and his political allies (the akazu) attempted to solidify 
their own power, fearing that a more democratic form of government would end to their 
political careers. But this only needlessly compounded the issue; and yet that may have 
just been the goal—to escalate ethnic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi by denying the 
latter those essential rights. Evidence of this possible strategy may lie in the fact that the 
                                            
5
 Hintjens, 258. 
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regime feared the rising power of the RPF and the Tutsi so much that they fabricated 
rhetoric to turn the Hutu in Rwanda against the inyenzi (“cockroaches”). After a 
demonstration in Kigali calling for democratization, the regime openly stated that 
“democratization” was nothing more than a cover for restoration of the Tutsi to positions 
of political and socio-economic power—the Hutu now feared a sort of renewed Tutsi 
hegemony and feudalism. Even more damning evidence of the regime’s tactics is 
illustrated by their elaboration of what was then called the “Bahima conspiracy.” 
According to the Habyarimana regime the Tutsi rebels had long been planning to 
take over the Rwandan government. But in order to take control of the democratically 
elected government, the minority Tutsi would somehow have to win a majority of the 
votes from the then-Hutu leadership. The conspiracy claimed that the Burundian Tutsi 
were willing to kill off enough of the Rwandan Hutu population to achieve their goals. 
For the Rwandan people, if these claims made by the government were in fact true, they 
would be at serious risk. The government continued to claim that the Tutsi were 
themselves planning a genocide against the Hutu; unless the Hutu took preventative 
measures, they would all be killed, or so claimed Juvenal Habyarimana.  
Thanks to the Habyarimana administration’s tactics of fear-mongering the Hutu 
population were incredibly nervous, wondering when this possible genocide might occur. 
When Tutsi rebel forces shot down Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane, killing him, the Hutu 
seemed to take this as the first steps toward their destruction. So, in response, they took 
the regime’s suggestion and took preventative measures. Over the next hundred or so 
days, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were slaughtered. And the only real reason 
was politics—Habyarimana’s fear of losing power directly caused so many deaths. 
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Some may argue that this ethnic conflict (and ultimately the genocide) was caused 
by the exit of the Belgian colonizers. Others may claim that it came as a result of growing 
tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi. However, I would argue that politics caused most of 
it. Indeed, the Belgians as well as both the Hutu and the Tutsi can and should, at least in 
some part, be blamed. Nevertheless, it is the administration of President Kayibanda and 
more so that of President Habyarimana that must shoulder much of the blame.  
The actions of both regimes to stifle any hopes of liberalization for the Tutsi were 
tragic and disastrous. Their mass murders and expulsions of so many Tutsi instilled in 
both ethnic groups a hatred for the other. But the numerous lies and ill-made decisions of 
the Habyarimana regime must be held directly accountable for the quick escalation in 
ethnic violence. Juvenal Habyarimana knew that his country was in dire straits, and yet 
he did nothing to help his people, Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa alike. Rather than putting money 
into a desperate economy he used those funds to maintain his chokehold on political 
power.  
Rwanda should be considered a prime example of how a government can directly 
influence the affairs of its people. Ethnic conflict had never been an issue prior to 
colonization, but it became a major issue when the Hutu came to power. A few in 
positions of power manipulated the people to their will, and as a result they left so many 
dead in their wake. Possibly democratization or liberalization could have prevented these 
tragedies. But ultimately it was the government that should have stopped this—yet it 
instead lauded it. Hopefully many can learn from the mistakes that Rwanda made and 
prevent ethnic conflict and genocide in the future. 
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But tragically the circumstances surrounding the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 
were not limited only to that event; indeed, Burundi experienced genocide under the same 
circumstances in 1972 and again in 1993. Burundi, unlike Rwanda, however, found the 
Tutsi suppressing the Hutu.  
Similar to the lead-up to Rwanda’s genocide, the politicking of the Burundian 
governmental administration over the minority ethnic group greatly exacerbated and 
escalated tensions and ultimately violence. The Ndadaye administration, a Hutu 
controlled group in a Tutsi controlled country, originally had attempted to smooth the 
racial divide. These attempts constantly aimed to inject more and more Hutu into the 
populations and more specifically into the echelons of the entrenched Tutsi army. 
Ultimately this proved to be a fatal mistake for the then peaceful nation, as the Tutsi 
eventually became enraged at the prospect of Hutu control in even limited circumstances.  
While Ndadaye’s intentions were to improve the democracy of Burundi by 
equalizing political participation among the ethnic groups of the countries, in practice his 
policies oppressed a number of Tutsi and showed overt favoritism toward the Hutu. 
Opposite of political liberalization, the 1993 genocide began with the murder of 
prominent Hutu leaders, including Ndadaye himself, and with the eventual slaughter of 
many more Hutu citizens by Tutsi radicalists.  
In the 1993 Burundian genocide, Smith’s hypothesis of political liberalization 
assuaging tensions was turned on its head. While the presidential administration 
attempted to politically liberalize the nation, unfortunately the opposite was practiced. 
The government’s good intentions were far from good practices—the intended outcome 
bred Tutsi violence.  
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Much more overt political participation was demonstrated in the 1972 Burundian 
genocide, however. In this case, the Tutsi president Michel Micombero declared martial 
law and demanded the slaughter of thousands of Hutu along with the expulsion of 
numerous others from the country. Orchestrating a massive genocide of the minority 
from within his own administration, Micombero exemplified the cause of the 1972 
genocide. His administration’s policy of political suppression and overt expulsion were 
the clear cause of the escalating violence of the two ethnic groups—nothing else can 
possibly explain the speed and the vigor with which such an extermination was executed. 
And this idea rings true also in 1993 and 1994 in both Burundi and Rwanda. 
Indeed, with both ethnic groups committing genocide actions against the other—
the Tutsi against the Hutu in Burundi, and the Hutu against the Tutsi in Rwanda—little 
evidence supports the claim that ethnicity and social problems contributed solely to the 
various genocides in the countries. Rather domestic and external foreign factors 
contributed immensely to the escalation of violence.  
Foreign, or external, factors such as economic problems as well as foreign 
national involvement in the Central African region, and sometimes more specifically in 
Rwanda and Burundi, played at least some contributory role in growing ethnic tensions. 
But more so, domestic factors like democratization and political liberalization, or lack 
thereof, are inextricably linked to the amassing anger and tension by both sides in both 
places. The political administrations, for instance, of Micombero and Ndadaye in Burundi 
and of Kayibanda and Habyarimana in Rwanda are perhaps the best explanations for the 
escalated and calculated violence of the genocides.  
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As these administrations applied domestic political reform, be it in the form of 
silencing the minority, or amplifying its voice, the government morphed political 
liberalization into political suppression and oppression. With these the radicalized ethnic 
groups were given approval to battle, harm, and slaughter one another. Whether overtly 
or indirectly, the political systems in place in both Burundi and Rwanda at least tacitly 
approved genocide time and time again. 
Each government instigated ultimate genocide, whether intentionally or 
incidentally. In Burundi, the Ndadaye administration clearly intended to provide 
meaningful and peaceful change, hopefully lessening the recent divide between the Tutsi 
and the Hutu. Nevertheless, good intentions were transformed into tragic violence, in the 
midst of government weakness and loss of control. Unfortunately, the other cases of the 
Micombero administration in Burundi and the Kayibanda and Habyarimana 
administrations in Rwanda tell an obviously different story: government complicity and 
support in ethnic violence. Each of these administrations, as the evidence suggests, 
intentionally supported one group over the other, suggesting and even funding organized 
violence. The Rwandan and Burundian governments fully understood the consequences 
of wholesale murder of entire societal groups, and the consequence was simple: ultimate 
economic and political power for the “better” group. As a result organized participation 
by the national army and other groups followed and bloodshed ensued—all to be 
exacerbated by the chaos that arose during the genocides. Nevertheless, regardless of 
whether control was maintained or lost, government approval directly moved mere 
ideology to action, preparation to genocide. 
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The issues of how governments interact with the governed has always been 
important, and in light of such events, they have become that much more important in 
Central Africa. In a review of history, it is noticeable that violence pervades Africa and 
the globe. But in a new era most violence is avoidable by simply supporting peaceful 
debate and ultimate reconciliation. The need for these new tactics is obvious when 
reviewing the genocides of Burundi and Rwanda. Nevertheless more research is required 
to determine the methods by which reconciliation can be achieved and the means by 
which non-violence is best advertised, especially in light of the potential consequences of 
ignoring such tactics.  
Indeed, these genocides have proven to be the ultimate blemishes upon the 
histories of Rwanda and Burundi. Their tragedies still demand answer to the questions 
that linger—why did these ethnic tensions emerge and so quickly lead to genocide and 
then continue moving forward? Only when genocide was clearly decried by those in 
power did it end and was it wiped, in some ways, from the public conscience. Still the 
wounds remain; but now these wounds are viewed as markings of a new era—an era of 
cooperation, not violence. These wounds have taught people of the wrongs committed by 
their governments and politicians. These wounds, although they remain unhealed, have 
healed much deeper wounds: the rifts between ethnic groups caused by the violence of 
the nineteenth century. 
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